"Harvest now, decrypt later" risk mitigation Protect the secrets that need to outlive 2035.

Immediate protection for long-lived sensitive data in transit and at rest, ahead of full migration.

Let's Build Together
Recorded today · readable when?1 readable while still secret
  • 30 yrs
  • 25 yrs
  • 10 yrs
  • 7 yrs
  • 37 days
Recorded today, readable in 2035: M&A data room.
Try: drag Q-day, or lock a dataset
Which data recorded today would still be secret when a quantum computer can read it Illustrative
  • Long-lived data mapped
  • Hybrid key exchange
  • Archives re-encrypted

You need this if

  1. You hold data that must stay secret for 10+ years
  2. Sensitive data crosses public networks or partners
  3. You're a likely target for state-level attackers

What we hand over

  1. Long-lived data identification and flow mapping
  2. Hybrid PQC key exchange on critical connections
  3. Archive re-encryption strategy
  4. Data minimization and retention review

What changes

  1. Your most valuable data protected now, not in five years
  2. Reduced value of anything already intercepted
  3. Clear evidence of proactive risk management

"Harvest now, decrypt later" risk mitigation, in plain words

Harvest now, decrypt later is an attack in which adversaries collect encrypted data today and store it until quantum computers can break the encryption. Data that must stay confidential for ten years or more, such as health, financial, government or trade-secret records, is already exposed to it.

Full migration takes years, but some data can't wait: health records, trade secrets, financial and government data that must stay confidential for a decade or more. We identify those data flows and protect them first, with hybrid post-quantum key exchange on critical links, re-encryption of long-retention archives and tighter controls on where that data travels.

2030
NIST begins deprecating RSA and ECC; both are disallowed by 2035NIST IR 8547 (opens in a new tab)

Reviewed by the engineers who run this practice.

Questions you'll ask first

Is this a real threat today?

For long-lived secrets, yes. The attacker doesn't need a quantum computer now, only your encrypted traffic or archives and patience. Health, financial, government and trade-secret data that must stay confidential for 10+ years is exposed already.

Which data should be protected first?

Data whose confidentiality must outlast the expected arrival of capable quantum computers, and that crosses public networks or third parties. We identify those flows with your data owners and rank them.

Can we protect it before a full migration?

Yes. Hybrid post-quantum key exchange on critical links and re-encryption of long-retention archives can be deployed now, ahead of the wider migration.

Sound familiar? Let's fix it.

One call with a senior engineer. You'll leave with a straight answer on what it would take.